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ABSTRACT
This article critically assesses claims that India has entered a new party system
after the 2014 general elections, marked by renationalisation with the BJP as
the new ‘dominant’ party.’ To assess these claims, we examine the electoral
rise of the BJP in the build-up to and since the 2014 general elections until
the state assembly elections in December 2018. Overall, we argue that despite
the emerging dominance of the BJP, a core feature of the third party system
-a system of binodal interactions- has remained largely intact albeit in a
somewhat weaker form. Furthermore, by comparing the post 2014 Indian
party system with key electoral features of the ﬁrst three party systems, we
conclude that the rise of the BJP has thrown the third-party system into crisis,
but does not yet deﬁne the consolidation of a new party system.
KEYWORDS India; party system; nationalization; BJP; Congress Party
Introduction
This article seeks to substantiate claims about the changing nature of the
Indian party system, following the 2014 general (national parliamentary) elec-
tions and 30 state (subnational) legislative assembly elections which have
taken place since. More in particular, it examines and challenges the assertion
that the 2014 general elections marked the start of a ‘fourth party system’ in
India’s post-independence electoral history.
Scholars of Indian party politics have identiﬁed three distinctive phases or
‘party systems’ in India since 1952 (Yadav 1999), the ﬁrst two of which (1952–
1989) were marked by the dominance of the Congress Party, the party which
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led India into independence and shaped its constitution. Although Congress
maintained its hold on central politics until 1989, scholars have usually ident-
iﬁed two distinctive phases within this period of one-party dominance. The
ﬁrst phase or so-called ‘ﬁrst party system’ lasted from 1952 until 1967. In this
period, Congress dominated the centre and nearly all of the Indian states.
The second party system covered the period between 1967 and 1989. In this
period, Congress retained its dominant position at the national level (except
for a brief period between 1977 and 1979) but faced ﬁercer competition
from other parties in the states with which it engaged in an often-confronta-
tional way. This period was also marked by higher electoral volatility and mobi-
lizing strategies of the Congress which varied signiﬁcantly from state to state.
One party-dominance broke down in 1989 with the emergence of a ‘post-
Congress’ polity. However, it took a decade of unstable coalitions and minority
governments (1989–98) before multipartisan tendencies in Indian politics had
fully crystallized into a new party system, India’s third (Yadav 1999; Singh and
Saxena 2003). This party system was marked by electoral competition
between two pre-electoral coalitions, namely the BJP-led National Democratic
Alliance and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance – it became known
as the ‘two national alliances’ (National Commission to Review the Working of
the Constitution 2002) or binodal1 system (Arora and Kailash 2013). This plur-
alized party system also coincided with diverse forms of party competition in
the states and the de facto decentralization of the Indian polity.2
Nonetheless, with the comprehensive and resounding reelection of the
incumbent United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in the 2009 elections to a
second term, in which the Congress Party improved its own seat share by
over 37 percent, coalition politics in India appeared to be entering a new
phase. Some observers even proclaimed the beginning of a re-nationalization
of India’s party system (The Hindu 2009), while others interpreted the 2009 elec-
tion results as a sign of its further fragmentation (Jaﬀrelot and Verniers 2011).
The result was also seen as evidence of the Congress party’s skill at forging stra-
tegic state-level agreements with regional(ist) parties while overlooking pro-
grammatic or ideological concerns (Kailash 2009). Overall, the prognosis was
that a return to single-party governments was unlikely in the near future.
All of this changed in 2014 when a landslide victory in the general elections
gave a decisive majority to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the lower house
of parliament. Signiﬁcantly reducing the strength of the opposition, it was
termed a dramatic result (Sridharan 2014) and a critical turning-point (Palshi-
kar 2014). The BJP’s majority in the Lok Sabha, with 282 (52%) seats, was both
unexpected and extraordinary. Furthermore, Congress, with less than 20
percent of the vote was reduced to 44 seats in the federal lower house. In
this context, the 2014 election result was associated with the renationalisation
of Indian politics (Vaishnav and Smogard 2014) in which the BJP had become
the new ‘dominant’ party’ replacing the Congress as the ‘system-deﬁning’
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party of the ﬁrst and second party systems (Chhibber and Verma 2014).
Indeed, some authors have gone as far as to identity the 2014 elections as
the start of a fourth party system (Chhibber and Verma 2018).
In this article we assess the validity of this claim based on a detailed assess-
ment of the electoral performance of the BJP and other political parties since
the 2014 general elections. We argue that these developments demonstrate
that at the national level the third party system has come under severe
strain. In fact, the extent to which party competition is still ‘binodal’ can be
questioned when the key node in one of the alliances has shrunk to about
a ﬁfth of its previous size (in seat share) while the other node has now
amassed more than half of the parliamentary seats on its own, weakening
the relative strength of its alliance partners. Yet a measure of dominance
cannot be based on one single election result alone, certainly not in a
multi-level democracy such as India. Overall, we make three claims.
Firstly, we support the view that the BJP is asserting its dominance across
India’s multi-level party system since 2014. Yet, this process is still ongoing,
and as we will demonstrate not irreversible. Furthermore, ‘one party domi-
nance’ is usually associated with a party which, ‘over time, is much more suc-
cessful in elections, in parliament and the government than any other party’
(Bogaards 2011, 1743–1744), yet there is no consensus on how long the party
needs to be successful for (for at least two consecutive general elections?), at
which levels (federal and/or regional?), and on how success is measured
(votes and/or seats?). Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence to show
that BJP dominance does not necessarily meet all of the criteria which Palshi-
kar (2018, 37) has attributed to party dominance ‘in the electorate’3; namely
(1) the inability of any polity-wide party (especially the Congress) to provide
a national alternative to the dominant BJP; (2) the possibility of ad hoc anti-
BJP coalitions at the state level which lack the ‘nodal’ stability of the bipolar
nodes in the third or post-Congress party system; (3) the progressive
decline in the electoral support of regional and regionalist parties; and (4)
the continued centrality of Modi as a strong central leader. Especially on
the second and third, and perhaps at the time of writing (February 2019)
even on the ﬁnal criteria, the ‘dominance’ of the BJP is not necessarily estab-
lished as much as is often assumed (on this point see also Diwakar 2016).
Secondly, using a Gini-based measure of party nationalization (Bochsler
2010) and a measure of party system congruence (Schakel 2013) we demon-
strate that while the BJP has improved its nationalization score since 2009, the
party system as a whole remains as denationalized as the party system in pre-
vious cycles of general and state assembly elections since 1999. Furthermore,
the BJP vote share and its nationalization does not yet parallel that of the Con-
gress during the ﬁrst and even second party systems.
Finally, by comparing the current Indianparty systemwith the ﬁrst three party
systems, we argue that the fourth party system is not yet upon us. This is so for
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two reasons. Firstly the decline in BJP support in some legislative assembly elec-
tions and several setbacks in by-elections between 2015 and 2019 illustrate that
inter-party interactions which entail a decisive shift in voter-party linkages – a
deﬁning feature of party system change (Sartori 1976, 43–44)4 – are far from
established. Secondly, the pre-2014 structure of binodal competition marked
by pre-electoral alliances – a core feature of inter-party interactions (Mair 2012,
94) marking the third party system – has far from collapsed.
In a nutshell, although post 2014 the BJP is dominant, destabilizing the
balance in electoral support between the two nodes within each alliance
(NDA and UPA) and between both alliances, to infer from this that the
binodal system has given way to a one-party dominant ‘system’ would
seem to be a conclusion more generous than just. All we can say is that the
system of binodal interactions that characterized the third-party system is
‘in crisis’. However, the third party system may breakdown if the BJP repro-
duces electoral support with only small-scale shifts in vote shares (leading
to an absolute majority of seats) in the 2019 general elections.
In what follows, we ﬁrst analyze the assertion of BJP dominance in the 2014
general elections (section 1) and in the assembly elections which have pre-
ceded the national election and followed since (section 2). We analyze the ter-
ritorial spread of the vote, the campaign methods by which it was achieved
and the extent to which that support was drawn equally from polity-wide,
regional or regionalist parties. In the third section we provide evidence to
query the start of a fourth party system by placing the rise of the BJP into a
longitudinal perspective, especially with reference to the ﬁrst and second
party systems. The conclusion summarizes our main argument.
Making sense of India’s 2014 election results: The assertion of
BJP dominance
In the federal election of 2014, the BJP claimed a landslide victory. The party
won 282 of the 543 seats in the lower house of parliament by itself and 336
seats together with its allies of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA),
handing an unprecedented defeat to the incumbent Congress-led United Pro-
gressive Alliance (UPA), which was reduced to 60 seats (of which Congress
only captured 44). These results illustrate the rise of the BJP (up from just
116 seats in the 2009 elections). However, some scholars believe that the
BJP win with only 31.3 percent of the vote share is underwhelming (Moussavi
and Macdonald 2015). The illusion of a landslide, so they argue, was the result
of the ﬁrst-past-the-post system, where no minimum threshold of votes is
required to win elections. Furthermore, although the BJP ﬁelded 427 candi-
dates (out of 543 single member-districts), its strike rate would have been con-
siderably lower without seat-sharing arrangements or pre-electoral alliances.
The BJP aligned itself with 10 parties in the National Democratic Alliance
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with which it made seat-sharing arrangements ahead of the elections (Srid-
haran 2014, 21).
Even so, 31 percent is a remarkable feat, especially in view of the ﬁercely
competitive nature of elections in the coalition era since 1996. The vote
share of the ﬁrst party within the ruling coalition typically ranged between
23 and 28 percent. The BJP’s success in 2014 unfolded in a context in
which elections had become even more contested (in 34.8 percent of consti-
tuencies there were more than 16 contestants as against 28.6 percent in 2009
(Election Commission of India, Electoral Statistics, 2016)). The results were also
dramatic because the BJP improved its vote share by 12.5 percent whereas
the support for Congress dropped by 9.2 percent.
The 2014 election results are a telling demonstration of the BJP’s ability to
maximize the vote-to-seat multiplier, or vote eﬃciency, to swing tightly-con-
tested seats in its favour. However, to what extent was the rise of the BJP ter-
ritorially (un)even, and why? The question is relevant because the BJP – being
traditionally weak in the Northeast and South of India – has long been seen as
a Hindi Belt (north and central India except Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir)
and western-India-centered party. To answer this question we organize India’s
states under ﬁve categories: Hindi Belt, East, North, North-East, South, and
West (see online Annex, Table A1). We compare the results of the 2009 and
2014 Lok Sabha elections. Figure 1 reveals both the absolute and relative per-
formance of the BJP in diﬀerent states. In relative terms we compare low (0–10
percent vote share), middle-level (11–30 percent vote share) and high-level
support states (31–50 percent vote share). Anything beyond the 50 percent
mark would signify exceptionally high support levels. The entire Hindi Belt
and the West gave high and middle-level support to the BJP in 2009, while
most of the South and the North-East expressed low levels of support. Karna-
taka (South) and Arunachal (North-East) were exceptions as high-level support
states and Assam (North East) was among the middle-level support states.
Figure 1 shows that in 2014, although the BJP vote advanced in nearly
every state, the gains, relative to 2009 elections, were highest (11–25
percent increase) among the middle-level support states, followed by the
high-level support states. The middle-level support states of the Hindi Belt
such as Haryana, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh and the North Eastern state of
Assam became high-level support states, as the BJP more than doubled or
even tripled its vote share. High-level support states in 2009 such as Gujarat
(West), Uttarakhand, Rajasthan, Himachal, Madhya Pradesh (all Hindi Belt),
and Goa (West) forged ahead to become ultra-high support states with
more than 50 percent support for the BJP in 2014. Quite surprisingly,
however, the BJP’s vote share did not increase signiﬁcantly in many of the
low-level support states (less than ﬁve percent increase) except West
Bengal (10.7 percent increase) and Meghalaya (8.9 percent increase). None-
theless even the relatively smaller gains in the North-East, South, and East
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of India mark a substantial achievement since support for the BJP and its
ideology in these regions was almost entirely absent before. Furthermore,
the exceptions among them, for the same reason, require some further
explanation.
In West Bengal, signiﬁcant relative gains pushed the BJP into third position.
Given that the CPI (M) lost more than 10 percent of the vote, scholars have
speculated on the BJP’s potential to overtake the CPI as the largest opposition
party within the state (Banerjee 2016). By crossing the 20 percent support
mark in Odisha, the BJP could also emerge as a credible alternative to the Con-
gress there. Relative vote gains were also considerable in Andhra Pradesh and
Tamil Nadu, even though support for the party remains well below the 10
percent mark in both states.
We argue that the impressive performance of the BJP in some states which
are generally averse to the Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) politics of the BJP can
be attributed to the campaign style and messaging of Prime Ministerial can-
didate Narendra Modi. In his relentless campaign rallies, Modi, in addition to
playing the development card, sought to broaden his territorial support by
appealing to distinctive regional sentiments and customs. This ‘regional mes-
saging’ took place despite the fact that the BJP’s campaign organization was
highly centralized. A review of the speeches which Modi delivered in various
parliamentary constituencies reveals that he not only wore the traditional
headgear and costume representative of each state and spoke a few
opening sentences in the appropriate regional language, but also that he
attempted to play to the sentiments of regional parties (the online annex
Figure 1. BJP vote shares in the 2009 and 2014 federal elections for 29 states.
Notes: See Table A1 in the Annex for the full names and classiﬁcation of the states.
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provides an overview of the main campaign strategies per state). His speeches
extolled the ideals of revered state leaders from an earlier era, while criticizing
the current regional state leaders for not upholding their predecessors’ ideals
and not being true to their own people. He even focused on constituency-
speciﬁc local issues and promised favours tailored to each state’s regional con-
cerns and local situation. He also assured states of a speciﬁc formula to
achieve double-digit growth. He promised to deliver the best public services
in each state, citing the example of Gujarat, which he claimed to have mod-
ernized himself during his term in oﬃce as its Chief Minister.
Paralleling the uneven vote share across diﬀerent categories of Indian
states, the BJP’s gain in seat share in the 2014 elections remained territorially
uneven. The party won 208 seats in just eight states adding 142 seats to what
it had won in 2009. The gains were strongest in Uttar Pradesh (+61), Mahar-
ashtra (+14), Bihar (+10), Madhya Pradesh (+11), Gujarat (+11), Rajasthan
(+21), Haryana (+7), and NCT of Delhi (+7). In ﬁve other states the BJP won
50 seats, either maintaining or consolidating its seat share: Karnataka (17),
Assam (7), Jharkhand (12), Chhattisgarh (10), and Himachal Pradesh (4). The
BJP also managed to seize all constituencies from incumbents in Jammu
and Kashmir (3) and Uttarakhand (5). Seven major states resisted the rise of
the BJP, restricting the party to eight seats in total: West Bengal (2 out of a
total of 42), Tamil Nadu (1/39), Andhra Pradesh (2/25), Odisha (1/21), Telan-
gana (1/17), Kerala (0/20), and Punjab (1/13). From 11 seats in the North
East (excluding Assam) the party could win only one. Thus, while the BJP
could not make a breakthrough in these seven major states, its victory in
terms of seat share was formidable in the Hindi Belt and the Western
states, geographic areas in which it stood strong already.
A second and related way of trying to make sense of territorial variations in
the vote is to assess where the BJP vote gains have come from by type of party.
Is this primarily from other polity-wide parties, from cross-regional parties or
from regional or regionalist parties? We deﬁne a polity-wide or national party
as a party which participates in general and state assembly elections in more
than half of the states whereas a cross-regional party is a party which partici-
pates in more than one but less than half of the states. Regional and region-
alist parties share a state-speciﬁc following, but as Adam Ziegfeld (2014)
observed, regionalist parties, unlike regional parties, emphasize regional or cul-
tural nationalism or represent concerns that are speciﬁc to their state. Based
on this deﬁnition, we have identiﬁed sixty-nine parties in India which are
regional or regionalist. The online appendix provides a list of parties and
their categorization as polity-wide, cross-regional, regional, and regionalist par-
ties. We also include independent candidates and other remaining parties
that contested elections. We zoom in on longitudinal shifts in the support
base for these various parties in the ﬁnal section, but here we only discuss
ﬁndings which compare the 2014 general elections with the 2009 general
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elections. Figure 2(A and B) present the share of the vote and seats in general
elections per type of party.
Figure 2(A) demonstrates a modest rise in the vote share for polity-wide
parties in the 2014 general elections compared with the 2009 result. The
BJP gained about 12.5 percent whereas the Congress vote share dropped
about 10 percent. Not all voters who deserted the Congress party embraced
the BJP. As Oliver Heath (2015) observed, the BJP was able to attract only 33
percent of those who voted Congress in 2009. Former Congress support may
have gone to regional or regionalist parties. The BJP also stole away votes
from cross-regional parties, such as the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Commu-
nist Party of India and various splits from this party. Furthermore, it eroded the
support base of regional parties. For instance, the BJP won 93 seats from Uttar
Pradesh and Bihar alone where it competed against regional parties and Con-
gress was not even a major player. In his analysis of the 2014 general elections,
K.K. Kailash observed that regionalist parties have been able to withstand the
rise of the BJP better than so-called regional parties (Kailash 2014; see also
Tillin 2015). In fact, Figure 2(A) shows that support for regionalist parties sub-
stantially increased between 2009 and 2014 (from 15 to about 20 percent of
the vote) in contrast with (cross-)regional parties which saw their share of the
vote decline (from 22.0 to 17.6 percent). Similarly, Figure 2(B) illustrates that
the representation of polity-wide parties in the Lok Sabha based on seat
shares has continued a slightly upward trend since 2009. The BJP defeated
Congress to such an extent that it could absorb about 85 percent of all
seats attributed to polity-wide parties. Indeed, most direct bilateral contests
between the BJP and Congress were won by the former (Palshikar 2014).
Figure 2(B) also conﬁrms that regionalist parties have been able to hold
onto their seats in the Lok Sabha much more successfully than regional
parties. In fact, regionalist parties represent more than a quarter of Lok
Sabha seats (compared with only about 14 percent in 2004), whereas the
seat share for regional parties has shrunk from above 9 to scarcely 4 percent.
Is there any relation between the success of the BJP in the Hindi Belt states
and its relative ability to outperform regional parties more so than the region-
alist ones? To answer this question, we plot electoral performance of the six
party types for the Hindi Belt states. We ﬁnd that regional parties are more
often found in the Hindi-heartland where BJP support has been more pro-
nounced than in the non-Hindi Belt states of the East, North-East, and
South of India. Figure 3(A and B) illustrate the share of the vote and represen-
tation of seats in the Lok Sabha for the ten Hindi Belt states only. In compari-
son with the polity-wide results shown in Figure 2(A and B), the support for
polity-wide parties is substantially higher in the Hindi Belt states. Regionalist
parties were never strong in the Hindi Belt, but several regional parties
(most notably the Samajwadi Party, Janata Dal United and the Rashtriya
Janata Dal) performed poorly in 2014, with many of their predominantly
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OBC (Other Backward Caste) or Dalit (Scheduled Caste) vote base ﬂocking to
the BJP instead. In other words, in the Hindi Belt vote changes not merely
reﬂect a move away from Congress to the BJP, but equally from regional
parties to the BJP.
Figure 2. (A) Vote share in federal elections per type of party (1952–2014). (B) Seat share
in federal elections per type of party (1952–2014).
Notes: Vote and seat shares are weighted by the size of the state electorate. See Table A2 in the onine
annex for a classiﬁcation of parties.
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The making and consolidation of BJP dominance: State
elections in the build up to and since the 2014 federal election
The magnitude of the BJP success in 2014 propelled the party to a more pro-
minent role in subsequent assembly elections. The party went on to win no
Figure 3. (A) Vote share in federal elections per type of party (1952–2014): Hindi Belt
states. (B) Seat share in federal elections per type of party (1952–2014): Hindi Belt states.
Notes: Shown are vote and seat shares weighted by the size of the electorate of the Hindi Belt states: 6 for
1952–1962; 7 for 1967–1999; 10 for 2004–2014. See Table A1 in the online annex for a classiﬁcation of
states and see Table A2 in the online annex for a classiﬁcation of parties.
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less than 16 state assembly elections between October 2014, expanding its
control (either on its own or in coalition) to 21 states by March 2018 from
just ﬁve in 2013. How did it happen? Is there an element of continuity in
the factors that led to the party’s unprecedented victory in the national elec-
tions and its impressive performance in the subsequent state assembly elec-
tions? Did the unexpected win of the BJP in the 2014 general election now
also start to erode the support base of the regionalist parties in subsequent
state assembly elections as said parties cannot longer exert inﬂuence in
national coalition politics. Equally, has the support base of the Congress
Party eroded further in state assembly elections since, given the party’s
weaker representation in national politics and the desire of third parties to
align themselves with the BJP as the most likely winner?
To answer these questions, one needs to look at state elections before and
after the 2014 federal election. In fact, we identity the 2012 December Gujarat
election as a critical state assembly election. Its nationalizing and mobilizing
impulse on the electorate can be read by contrasting BJP support in state
assembly elections between January 2008 and 31 December 2012 with the
party’s electoral following in later state assembly elections. Table 1 conﬁrms
the December 2012 Gujarat elections as a watershed. In our calculations,
states are weighted equally by averaging state assembly election results.
We compare separately for state assembly elections in all 30 states (plus elec-
tions in the union territory assemblies of Delhi and Puducherry) and in the 17
largest Indian states plus Delhi (see online Annex Table A1). The latter count
for more than 90 percent of the population.
Table 1 clearly demonstrates that the support for the BJP, in terms of vote
share, increased signiﬁcantly in state assembly elections post 2012, rising on
average by 7 percent compared with state assembly elections held in the
period between January 2008 and December 2012. The rise is signiﬁcant, irre-
spective of whether it is measured across all states, the 17 largest states plus
Delhi, the Hindi Belt, or non-Hindi Belt states.
Indeed, our ﬁndings make a further distinction between Hindi Belt states
and the non-Hindi Belt states for reasons set out above. Table 1 clearly
demonstrates that although the support for the BJP rises in both categories
of states, that rise was less steep in the non-Hindi states; leaving a consider-
able gap in its performance across both sets of states. Mimicking the rise of
the BJP is the sharp fall in support of the Indian National Congress, especially
in the non-Hindi Belt states. The less pronounced fall of the Congress in the
Hindi Belt may well be explained by the fact that the party was already
reduced to a minor party in some of the Hindi Belt states most notably
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh well before the 2013 assembly elections.
In terms of seat share, the rise of the BJP is especially signiﬁcant in the Hindi
Belt states, where electoral support of around 38 percent (Table 1) easily trans-
lates into seat shares of more than 50 percent. Although the decline in
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support for the Congress Party generates a signiﬁcant drop in seats shares for
the party between 7 and 10 percent across all states, until November 2018
that drop was momentous in those Hindi Belt states in which Congress has
been engaged in bipolar competition against the BJP. Successive wins for
the Congress in three important Hindi-belt states (Rajasthan, Madhya
Pradesh and Chattisgarh) narrowed this gap to about 10 percent.
In Table 2 below, we have listed the performance of the BJP, Congress Party
(INC) as well as a set of regional or regionalist parties in order to analyze in
how far the rise of the BJP has altered party competition in the states. For
each state, we list the nature of dominant party competition (classiﬁed on
the basis of their two strongest parties in vote-share between 2004 and
2009). Party competition can revolve around national or polity-wide parties
(as in most of the Hindi Belt states, except for Uttar Pradesh and Bihar), pit
a national against a regional (as in Bihar or Uttar Pradesh) or regionalist
party (as in much of the North-East, South, East, and Maharahstra), or
involve competition between two regional(ist) parties (as in Tamil Nadu).
We consider assembly elections between 2004 and 2009, 2009 and 2014
and since 2014 until December 2018. Table 2 lists for each state, the position
of the party holding the largest and the second largest share of votes. Table 3
is a summative table, distinguishing between diﬀerent forms of party compe-
tition by listing the number of states in which the BJP, INC, a regional or
regionalist party comes ﬁrst or second.
Table 2 clearly illustrates the rising support of the BJP (marked in bold)
across all type of state party systems since 2014. The party is ﬁrst in ﬁve
states in which party competition (based on the 2004–2009 classiﬁcation) is
predominantly between polity-wide parties (but one down from its position
in 2004–09). In Delhi the AAP displaced Congress as the largest party in the
Table 1. Vote shares in regional elections.
Votes Seats
BJP INC BJP INC
State type N mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
All 30 Before 16.4 15.1 30.7 11.2 19.0 21.9 34.9 21.4
41 After 23.8 16.6 26.5 13.8 27.5 26.7 26.7 22.9
Change 7.4 ** −4.1 * 8.5 * −8.2 *
18 largest 18 Before 19.7 14.7 28.0 12.1 22.9 22.9 31.5 18.8
25 After 26.8 14.9 25.8 13.4 31.3 26.7 24.6 21.3
Change 7.1 * −2.2 8.3 −6.9
non-Hindi Belt 20 Before 10.6 13.2 31.2 10.7 11.1 19.6 34.8 22.5
27 After 16.2 14.9 25.9 13.8 15.9 19.8 27.6 23.6
Change 5.6 * −5.8 * 4.8 −7.2
Hindi Belt 10 Before 28.1 11.6 29.6 12.6 34.8 18.0 35.1 20.2
11 After 38.4 7.0 27.8 14.3 50.0 24.3 24.9 22.1
Change 10.3 ** −1.8 15.2 ** −10.2
Notes: Comparison between elections held before (between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2012)
versus after 1 January 2013. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05 (one-sided; t-tests with unequal variances assumed).
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2013 and 2015 assembly elections, but the BJP is the strongest opposition
party (and also captured all Delhi seats in the 2014 parliamentary elections).
With the exception of Jharkhand, the BJP did not come ﬁrst or second
among the 16 states in which competition revolved between a national
party (Congress, CPI) and a regional(ist) party between 2004 and 2009. Now
it is the strongest party in six states among that cohort and it is placed
second in a further two. That the BJP has not advanced further is largely
due to the sustained success of the regionalist parties which, as in the 2014
general elections have been able to hold on to their top positions much
better than regional parties. Regional(ist) parties dominate about as many
state assemblies after 2014 as between 2009 and 2014 (see Table 3). Finally,
by displacing regional parties from power in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the
BJP has become the largest in two states in which competition revolved
mainly between regional parties, but it has not been able to break through
in Tamil Nadu where regionalist parties continue to dominate.
Table 2. Party competition in 30 states since 2004.
Party State 2004–2009 2009–2014 post-2014
Competition
1st–2nd
party
1st–2nd
party
1st–2nd
party
National-National Chhattisgarh BJP-INC BJP-INC INC-BJP
Delhi INC-BJP BJP-AAP AAP-BJP
Goa INC-BJP BJP-INC BJP-INC
Gujarat BJP-INC BJP-INC BJP-INC
Himachal Pradesh BJP-INC INC-BJP BJP-INC
Karnataka INC-BJP INC-BJP INC-BJP
Madhya Pradesh BJP-INC BJP-INC BJP-INC
Rajasthan BJP-INC INC-BJP INC-BJP
Uttarakhand BJP-INC INC-BJP BJP-INC
National-(Cross-)Regional(ist) Andhra Pradesh INC-TDP INC-TDP TDP-YSRCP
Arunachal Pradesh INC-IND INC-NCP INC-BJP
Assam INC-AGP INC-AGP INC-BJP
Haryana INC-INLD INC-INLD BJP-INLD
Jharkhand BJP-IND BJP-INC BJP-JMM
Jammu and Kashmir JKN-INC JKN-INC BJP-JKPDP
Kerala CPM-INC CPM-INC CPM-INC
Maharashtra INC-SHS INC-NCP BJP-SHS
Meghalaya INC-NCP INC-IND INC-NPP
Manipur INC-IND INC-AITC BJP-INC
Mizoram MNF-INC INC-MNF MNF-INC
Nagaland INC-NPF NPF-INC NPF-NDPP
Odisha INC-BJD BJD-INC BJD-INC
Punjab INC-SAD INC-SAD INC-SAD
Sikkim SDF-INC SDF-INC SDF-SKM
Tripura CPM-INC CPM-INC BJP-CPM
Telangana TRS-INC TRS-INC
Regional(ist)-(Cross-)Regional
(ist)
Bihar RJD-JD(U) JD(U)-RJD BJP-RJD
Tamil Nadu ADMK-DMK ADMK-DMK ADMK-DMK
Uttar Pradesh BSP-SAP SAP-BSP BJP-BSP
West Bengal CPM-AITC AITC-CPM AITC-CPM
Notes: The table displays the parties that are ranked ﬁrst or second based on their party vote shares won in
state election during the time period. Regionalist parties are underlined. The party system characteriz-
ation is based on the 2004–2009 time period. See Table A1 in the Annex for the full names of states.
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The evolution of the Congress (underlined in Table 2) tells a diﬀerent story.
Except for Delhi the Congress remains the second largest party in those states
with competition between national or polity-wide parties only. As, we will
discuss below, it even wrested back control from the Bharatiya Janata Party
in the November–December 2018 elections in Chhattisgarh, Madhya
Pradesh, and Rajasthan, three Hindi-heartland states. However, with the
exception of Mizoram, Kerala, Odisha and Telangana it is not well placed to
ﬁght back in those states where polity-wide parties compete against regional
or regionalist parties. In several of these states the BJP has displaced Congress
as the largest party or pushed it into third position. Table 3 illustrates the
advance of the BJP as ﬁrst or second party at the expense of the INC. Region-
alist and regional parties more or less held their strength within the party
system, albeit more successfully so in case of the former.
What enabled the BJP to do so well in most state assembly elections since
2014? Firstly, the BJP rode the coattails of its national win in state assembly
elections that were held in 2014, shortly after the general election (Haryana,
Maharashtra, Jammu and Kashmir, and Jharkhand). Engineering political
defections and caste arithmetic were integral to the plan – for instance, in
Haryana, the BJP engineered defections by oﬀering tickets to 32 rebel
leaders of the Congress and the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD), mostly Jats,
while at the same time appealing to its core constituency among non-Jats
(First Post 2014). Furthermore, in none of the states did the BJP announce
its chief ministerial candidate. The party’s campaign image built on Modi
and his call for corruption-free politics was key to its success (see online
Annex for an overview of regional campaign narratives).
Yet, state Assembly elections in 2015 did not go as planned. In Delhi, the
BJP did not win, as voters could opt for a strong and corruption-free alterna-
tive instead; that of Arvind Kejriwal of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), a party
which like the BJP also mobilized young volunteers in tireless grass-roots cam-
paigning (Mathur 2014). Something similar happened in Bihar, where Nitish
Table 3. Summary of party competition in 30 states since 2004.
2004–2009 2009–2014 post-2014
BJP 1st 7 6 13
INC 1st 13 13 7
Regionalist 1st 9 11 10
BJP 2nd 3 4 6
INC 2nd 11 12 10
Regionalist 2nd 15 14 14
BJP prominent 10 10 19
INC prominent 24 25 17
Regionalist prominent 24 25 24
Notes: The table displays the number of states where the BJP, INC or a regional(ist) (REG) party was the
largest (1st) or second largest (2nd) party based on vote shares won in the state election. The ﬁnal rows
display sums of ﬁrst and second places per party.
342 A. H. SCHAKEL ET AL.
Kumar, Chief Minister since 2005, provided a credible and ‘corruption-free’
alternative to the BJP. Furthermore, playing on regional sentiment, Kumar out-
maneuvered Modi: his ‘Bihari versus Bahari’ (outsider) slogan catapulted a
‘Grand Alliance’ (in which two regional parties and the Congress joined
forces) to an outstanding victory in the assembly (Kumar 2015). Furthermore,
while Kumar stuck to his model of ‘inclusive development’, the BJP, by 2015,
had appeared to have switched back from a development message to identity
politics and religious polarization (see below). In the following year, the BJP
did not make headway in any of the states or union territories with strong
regionalist parties (Puducherry, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal), with the excep-
tion of Assam where it displaced a twice incumbent and increasingly unpop-
ular Congress-government (Ananth 2016; Roy 2016; Seethi 2016). To counter
its replacement with a regionalist party, the BJP had forged a rainbow alliance
with two such parties, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and the Bodoland
People’s Front (BPF), and also engineered defections from the Congress
party. Furthermore, it played to regional sentiments by employing a ‘sons
of the soil’ (nativist) campaign particularly targeting ‘Muslim or Bangladeshi
immigrants’, and unlike in most of the previous state assembly elections
anointed a local leader as Chief Ministerial candidate ahead of the election
(Misra 2016).
Between February 2017 and May 2018, assembly elections were held in
Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Goa, Uttarakhand, Manipur, Himachal Pradesh,
Gujarat, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, and Karnataka. In Goa, Manipur, and
Meghalaya, elections resulted in a fractured mandate with the Congress
party winning the largest number of seats (Noronha 2017; Phanjoubam
2017). However, in each of these states, the BJP formed post-poll alliances
with regional parties and independents to claim majority support. The gover-
nors in these states (always appointed by the central hence BJP government)
promptly invited the BJP to form the state government, ignoring the claims of
the Congress. In Karnataka, Congress prevented the BJP from adopting this
strategy again by forging ties with a regional party (Janata Party) and even
conceding the Chief Ministerial post to that party, despite its smaller share
of the vote and seats (The Hindu 2018). The Nagaland elections also gave a
hung verdict, with the Nagaland People’s Front (NPF) being the largest
party. However, the BJP managed to form the government by supporting
the Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (NDPP) and gaining the
support of smaller parties in the assembly (Phanjoubam 2018).
What appears to have set the 2017–2018 elections apart from earlier elections
is the (selective) move away from development in the campaign (given that job-
creation and economic growth ﬁgures were not living up to expectations) to
‘Moditva’ (a word-play on Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism), in which develop-
ment sits alongside a narrative of Hindu nationalism (Tharamalangam 2016).
Regional variations remain: in some states of the North-East (some of which
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have large tribal and/or Christian populations) the BJP reiterated its develop-
ment promise and pledged to use its control of the central government to
that eﬀect. However, ‘Moditva’ played a more prominent role in the BJP’s tra-
ditional strongholds. For instance, in the Gujarat elections, to consolidate
Hindu votes, Modi declared that a vote for Congress would be a vote for Pakistan
and that Pakistan wanted the Congress party to win. Such statements were care-
fully combined with the standard rhetoric of development, opposing corruption,
controlling black money and improving law and order. In Uttar Pradesh and
Uttarakhand, the BJP did not project a Chief Ministerial candidate, but fought
the elections in the name of Modi himself. The party’s eﬃcient electoral
machine mobilized voters from every nook and cranny (Jha 2017). The BJP’s
IT cell created thousands of WhatsApp groups and waged a data war, circulating
provocative messages to shore up support. Furthermore, Modi carried out a
relentless election campaign to project himself as a crusader against corruption
and black money. By making references to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and
India’s surgical strikes in response, he sought to convey his concern for national
security. He also deﬂected criticism related to his demonetization initiative (in
November 2016, without advance warning, 85% of cash notes were withdrawn
from circulation), defending it as a measure aiming to counter black money, dry
up funding for terrorism, and facilitating the transition into a cashless economy.
Amit Shah, the BJP President, engineered defections of OBC leaders from the
BSP, SP and Congress. In an attempt to split Dalit votes, Modi promised a post-
humous Bharat Ratna (India’s highest civil honour) for Kanshi Ram (the founder
of the BSP and mentor of Mayawati, the Dalit BSP leader). The BJP’s emphasis on
Moditva and its formidable electoral machinery did not work in Punjab though
where a twice incumbent SAD-BJP government faced a credible and clean lea-
dership alternative in the person of Captain Amarinder Singh, a seasoned Con-
gress leader (EPW 2017). The November and December 2018 assembly elections
put an even stronger halt to the streak of BJP wins: the BJP lost control of three
important Hindi-belt states (Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan) to the
Congress, but only in the case of Chhattisgarh on the basis of a decisive gap in
the vote. Although Congress lost Mizoram, it retained its second place in the
state party system (though the BJP increased its vote share by 8 percent com-
pared with 2014). The same was true for Telangana. Thus, in both of the latter
states, Congress is in a stronger position than the BJP to mount a potential
comeback.
The third party system is in crisis, but not yet dead
Notwithstanding the BJPs impressive electoral performance, we issue a note
of caution not to read too much into these victories just yet. For starters,
there are some signs of the Modi wave weakening, which can be linked to
four observations.
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Firstly, the BJP could win only ﬁve out of 27 Lok Sabha by-polls conducted
since the 2014 elections. In most of these by-elections, a united opposition
defeated the BJP (The Hindu 2018). As a result, the BJP’s share of seats has
come down from 282 to 268, four less than the halfway mark of 272.5 Since
anti-incumbency will potentially reduce the number of BJP seats in the
2019 general elections compared with 2014, its reliance on the support of
junior partners is likely to increase rather than decrease.
Secondly, Figure 4, which is almost a perfect ‘mirror-image’ of Figure 1,
shows that the party’s hold on voters who had supported Modi in 2014 is
declining based on the party’s performance in state assembly elections.
Thus, the rising support for the BJP has not discouraged voters from support-
ing regional or regionalist parties even though the favourable opportunity
structure in which these parties could exert inﬂuence at the centre in the
coalition-era is no longer present. Signiﬁcant exceptions to this trend are
the North Eastern states of Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya where the
party’s rise is linked to defections and Tripura, where the BJP was able to
able to secure the support of the tribal community (Roy 2018).
Thirdly, by losing three important Hindi-heartland states to Congress in
November 2018, the BJP has demonstrated its vulnerability. Although in
two of these states the contest was extremely close, the BJP losses here
may have undermined the party’s narrative of invincibility. Such a narrative
Figure 4. BJP vote shares in the 2014 federal election and subsequently held state elec-
tions.
Notes: See Table A1 in the Annex for the full names and classiﬁcation of the states. Madhya Pradesh,
Mizoram, and Rajasthan are not shown because these states did yet have held their state elections at
the writing of this election article.
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had even driven some erstwhile allies of the BJP to desert the National Demo-
cratic Alliance as its leadership style was perceived to be arrogant (The New
Indian Express 2018). For instance, the BJP lost the support of the TDP
(Andhra Pradesh).
The assembly elections of late 2018 may have forced the BJP into altering
its strategy. On the one hand, opposition parties feel they can gain votes by
raking up issues such as a negative growth of employment, farm distress
and a sharp rise in agrarian riots, thus exposing weaknesses in the BJP’s devel-
opment record, a key component of its 2014 electoral platform. On the other
hand, the BJP has felt it necessary to seek ties with some (erstwhile or new)
allies, realizing that it may need them to win the 2019 general elections.
After all, by December 2018, the BJP controls only about a third of the state
assembly seats and the party only enjoys an absolute majority in six out of
18 states in which it currently (co-)governs. Hence, it renewed electoral alli-
ances with Shiv Sena (Maharashtra), the Janata Dal (U) in Bihar, the Shrimoni
Akali Dal (Punjab), and it has forged an alliance with the AIADMK (the largest
party of Tamil Nadu) and seeks to extend similar alliances in other states
where it is weak (e.g. Kerala and Andhra Pradesh) (The Hindustan Times
2019). Finally, the BJP has mended bridges with erstwhile allies in the
North-East, e.g. with the Asom Gana Parishad. In turn, the Congress is
seeking to forge comparable alliances with regional allies in those states
where it knows it cannot win the elections on its own. Therefore, the building
of a two alliance system centred around the BJP and Congress, a core feature
of the third party system is crystalizing itself once more ahead of the 2019
general elections.
Finally, Narendra Modi as Prime Minister remains a ‘trump card’ in the view
of many voters. In the most recent ‘Mood of the Nation Poll tracker’, 46
percent of respondents see him best suited to be the next prime minister
of India, against 34 percent who back Rahul Gandhi, the Congress leader,
but in January 2017 these ﬁgures stood at 65 and 10 percent respectively
(India Today 2019).
Apart from cautioning against reading too much in the BJP victories since
2014, we also argue that psephologists who declare the start of a fourth party
system (marked by BJP one party dominance) should do so by placing the
core features of the current party system into a longitudinal perspective.
This can be done in three ways.
Firstly, we can revisit Figure 2(A and B). Taking into consideration that
most of the voters who supported polity-wide parties in 1967–1989 in
general elections supported Congress or the BJP, with about 31 percent of
the polity-wide vote the BJP is still some way oﬀ the dominant electoral
and seat share status of the Congress Party in the 1980s, at least based on
its performance in general elections. Until 1989, this never fell below 40
percent.
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Secondly, we can assess the extent to which the BJP has developed into a
genuine polity-wide party, i.e. by amassing its support across as many of the
states and territories of the Indian federation as possible. The assumption is
that dominance is not only a function of overall vote share in a national elec-
tion, but also of the ability to obtain consistently high vote shares across as
many of the states as possible in national and state elections. Until recently,
the BJP was believed to score worse on this metric than Congress, given its
traditional support in the Hindi Belt and West of India. We calculate Daniel
Bochsler’s (2010) party nationalization score to illustrate this point. This
score expresses the extent to which a party obtains similar vote shares
across all the various states of India. It ranges from 0 (in which case a party
is assumed to obtain all its votes from within one state) to 1 (which
assumes that a party obtains an identical share of the vote across all the
states of a federation). Importantly, nationalization scores only consider the
distribution of a party’s vote across the states, but not its size. Table 4
below lists party nationalization scores for the BJP and INC in recent national
and state elections. The national ﬁgures list standardization scores in a given
federal election. The state election scores list nationalization scores for the
cycle of state assembly elections starting from the date of the previous
general election until the date of the general election for which a date is
listed (hence the nationalization scores for state elections in 2014 calculate
party nationalization on the basis of party shares in state assembly elections
which have taken place after the federal election in May 2014).
Table 4 demonstrates that until the federal election of 2014 the Congress
Party had a more evenly spread support base than the BJP in federal and state
elections. But this situation reverses as of the federal elections of 2014 when
the BJP and Congress have the same territorial spread and their nationaliza-
tion score is just marginally (0.06) diﬀerent in the cycle of state assembly elec-
tions after 2014. Therefore, in time, the data shows evidence of the BJP’s rising
nationalization, especially in state assembly elections and of a decline in the
territorial spread of the INC vote across national and state assembly elections
since 2014. However, if we situate these ﬁgures in a more longitudinal per-
spective, then the nationalization of the BJP remains well below that of the
Congress Party in the period of the ﬁrst and second party systems. Indeed,
Table 4. Party nationalization scores.
Election Federal elections State elections N
(cycle) BJP INC BJP INC States
1999 0.71 0.74 0.61 0.71 26
2004 0.69 0.75 0.61 0.75 29
2009 0.62 0.77 0.60 0.75 28
2014 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.66 30
Notes: Party nationalization scores weighted by the size of state electorates and the number of states
(Bochsler 2010).
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between 1952 and 1989, the Congress obtained nationalization scores in
general and state assembly elections which approximated or even exceeded
values of 0.9 (Schakel and Swenden 2018, 16). Given that such a territorial
spread was combined with vote shares in general elections which exceeded
40 percent up until the 1989 national elections, the Congress was compara-
tively more dominant than the BJP today.
Finally, the long-term nationalization of a party system can be expressed
by calculating congruence measures. We look here at one of a range of
measures which have been developed by Arjan H. Schakel (2013), namely
party system congruence. Party system congruence measures the extent
to which a particular state party system is diﬀerent from a federal party
system and it is the result of two sources of variation: the extent to
which voters in a general election across the polity are diﬀerent from the
electorate within a particular state or union territory in the same
(general) election and the extent to which voters within a particular state
or union territory switch their vote between federal and state assembly
elections. Hence party system congruence maximizes variation in the
level of aggregation and the type of election. The more congruent or
more nationalized a party system, the lower the degree of dissimilarity in
electoral outcomes when varied by level of aggregation and type of elec-
tion; the more incongruent or less nationalized a party system, the
higher the degree of dissimilarity in electoral outcomes when varied by
level of aggregation and type of election. In Figure 5 below, the x-axis
denotes a set of elections, whereby each year corresponds with a
general election and a set of state assembly elections held thereafter
until the next general election (the 2014 data incorporate state assembly
elections results until December 2018). The y-axis denotes dissimilarity
values, i.e. the higher the value, the less nationalized or congruent is the
party system.
Based on the evidence produced here, the Indian party system remains as
denationalized as for previous cycles of general and state assembly elections
since 1999. Therefore, while we do not dispute the dominance of the BJP at
the moment, especially in light of Congress’s decline; the position of the
BJP in the party system does not appear to be strong enough to reproduce
the level of dominance which marked the more nationalized of especially
the ﬁrst- and second-party systems.
Conclusion: The 2019 general election as a critical juncture
The BJP’s unexpected rise to federal power in 2014 and the landslide victories
in state assembly elections held close to the national elections led political
scientists to proclaim the dominance of the BJP and the arrival of India’s
fourth party system. In this article, we took a closer look at the data to
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investigate whether such a conclusion is warranted. The analysis in the ﬁrst
two sections clearly demonstrated that the BJP has established a dominant
position in the Indian political landscape. However, we also observed the resi-
lience of a structural split between the Hindu nationalist and regional(ist)
domains of politics. The ruling party has not yet succeeded in integrating
the non-Hindi Belt cultures into its discourse, despite the BJP-RSS eﬀort to
produce a narrative of inevitability and some electoral successes in the
North-East.
Furthermore, the very dominance of the BJP appears to be quite fragile.
The party’s rise is mainly attributable to its performance in the Hindi Belt,
well known for anti-incumbency swings, except where the incumbents
deliver on economic performance. The BJP, even during the so-called
Modi Tsunami, could not outmaneuver regionalist parties. Finally,
opposition unity, although diﬃcult to orchestrate given the conﬂicting
ambitions of the opposition leaders, can still pose a serious threat to the
BJP’s winning streak, as was evidenced by the assembly elections in
Bihar and Karnataka. More recently, the BJP lost where it appeared to be
Figure 5. Party system congruence between federal and state elections since 1952.
Notes: Shown are dissimilarity scores (percent votes) between a federal election and subsequently held
state elections held at the same time or after the federal election but before the next federal election.
Dissimilarity scores are calculated based on Schakel (2013). A box plot distributes values into four
groups with each 25 per cent of the observations. The values of the ﬁrst quartile of observations lies in
between the bottom line of the box and lower whisker, the second quartile in between the bottom
line of the box and the middle line of the box which is the median, the third quartile between the
median and the upper line of the box, and the fourth quartile between the upper line of the box and
upper whisker. Dots are outliers which have values more than 3/2 times of the upper quartile.
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strongest: in those states where it faced a direct competition from the
Congress.
To decode the spectacular rise of the BJP, we determined the December
2012 Gujarat election to be critical. We disaggregated state-by-state data
on vote and seat share of the political parties based on two criteria: (a) cul-
tural-locational attributes (Hindi Belt, West, South, East, North, and North-
East) and (b) the type of political party competition. We argued that the
party’s rise is linked primarily with its performance in the Hindi Belt and in
the Western states where the party competes either with a national party
or with caste-based regional parties. However, the party has made some unex-
pected advances in both national and state assembly elections in other
regions as well. In some low-level support states the BJP even managed to
form the government by securing post-poll alliances with regionalist parties
and by engineering defections from rival parties.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the BJP dominance (and the decline of the Con-
gress) has certainly thrown the third party system into crisis, although
key features of it (the strength of regionalist parties, and the forging of
competing alliances centered around the BJP and Congress nodes ahead
of the 2019 general elections) remain intact. Furthermore, despite the
impressive set of BJP wins in state assembly elections since 2014, the
BJP vote is not quite as nationalized as that of Congress during the ﬁrst
and second party systems. Equally, in spite of the party’s rise, India’s con-
temporary party system as a whole is more alike the party systems of
the coalition-era, marked by comparatively low levels of congruence or
nationalization of the vote. That said, we acknowledge that the current
party system stands at a critical juncture.
The outcome of the 2019 elections may well reassert a more recognizable
pattern of binodal party competition in which the BJP lacks an absolute
majority and the NDA and UPA are more evenly matched. However, should
the BJP reassert itself with an absolute majority, the fourth party system
may well be upon us. Yet, critical junctures need not necessarily be followed
by a new pathway; they may well reinforce an existing path. Only a resound-
ing win in the 2019 general elections could seal the return to a one party
dominant system, and in fact assert BJP hegemony, i.e. forcefully assert its
ideology not just dominance.6
Notes
1. Named as such to reﬂect bipolar competition, with the Congress and BJP as the
‘nodes’ of two competing alliances.
2. The relationship between the (de)centralization of the party system and the
(de)centralization of the Indian polity is contested and a detailed debate falls
beyond the scope of this paper. Chhibber and Kollman (2004) argue that
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institutional, especially ﬁscal decentralization has triggered a more denationa-
lized party system. However, there is also a widespread literature which suggests
that the advent of coalition politics at the centre with the inclusion of state-
based or regional parties in government induced a more decentralized polity
– more so in practice (e.g. in the much less widely practiced suspension of
state autonomy by the centre) than in form (constitutional change). For a
summary and various articles addressing this issue, see (Sharma and Swenden
2017).
3. Palshikar (2018) has added criteria which are not linked to electoral performance
per se, but associate dominance with the social base of the party and its ability to
dominate the electoral narrative. We do not touch upon both of these explicitly
in this article, although brieﬂy make reference to these in our conclusion.
4. Sartori deﬁnes a party system as ‘the system of interactions resulting from inter-
party competition’ (1976, 44). The notion of ‘system’ implies some degree of
regularity, that is, continuity of inter-party interactions between elections
(Sartori 1976, 43).
5. The eﬀective strength of Lok Sabha has been reduced to 522 with two 22 seats
falling vacant, as on 6 February 2019. In that sense the BJP still holds a majority
with 268 seats.
6. Note that Palshikar (2018) also adds two further characteristics of dominance which
were left outside our analysis: the extent to which the BJP has been able to widen its
social base and the ability of voters to trust its narrative irrespective of its (socio-
economic) performance in the national or state governments which it controls.
As Suri and Palshikar (2014) and Chhibber and Verma (2018) show, the ability of
the BJP to capture the support of diﬀerent social segments (except the Muslimmin-
ority community) is impressive, but Chhibber and Verma also point at the rising dis-
satisfaction among young voters (who do not share the BJPs Hindu agenda) and
poorer voters (especially Dalits). Palshikar’s second characteristic is more a
measure of ‘hegemony’ i.e. the ability of the BJP to exert ‘ideological, moral or cul-
tural’ leadership or dominance over an otherwise socially diverse electorate. This
would require a deeper analysis of the narratives during election campaigns and
the extent to which they impregnate attitudes of voters. Furthermore, in our
view hegemony is a more longitudinal process which can be the result of party
dominance sustained over multiple election cycles. Since, at the time of writing,
the BJP government is only completing its ﬁrst term in national oﬃce, we ﬁnd
any evidence that hints at ‘hegemonization’ inconclusive at this point.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Ananth, V. K. 2016. “Democratic Process Not Yet Lost in Tamil Nadu.” Economic and
Political Weekly 51 (22): 26–28.
Arora, B., and K. K. Kailash. 2013. “The New Party System: Federalised and Binodal.” In
Party System in India: Emerging Trajectories, edited by Ajay K. Mehra, 235–261. New
Delhi: Lancer Publishers.
Banerjee, S. 2016. “West Bengal Elections. Myopic Popular Verdict in a Political
Vacuum.” Economic and Political Weekly 51 (36): 28–30.
REGIONAL & FEDERAL STUDIES 351
Bochsler, D. 2010. “Measuring Party Nationalisation: A New Gini-based Indicator that
Corrects for the Number of Units.” Electoral Studies 29 (1): 155–168. doi:10.1016/j.
electstud.2009.06.003.
Bogaards, M. 2011. “One Party Dominance.” In International Encyclopedia of Political
Science, edited by D. Badie, D. Berg-Schlosser, and L. Morlino, 1743–1744. London:
Sage.
Chhibber, P. K., and K. Kollman. 2004. The Formation of National Party Systems:
Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United
States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Chhibber, P. K., and R. Verma. 2014. “It is Modi, not BJP that Won this Election.” The
Hindu, June 1. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Itis-Modi-not-BJP-that-
won-this-election/article11640727.ece.
Chhibber, P. K., and R. Verma. 2018. Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of
India. New York: Oxford University Press.
Diwakar, R. 2016. “Change and Continuity in Indian Politics and the Indian Party
System. Revisiting the Results of the 2014 General Elections.” Asian Journal of
Comparative Politics 2 (4): 327–346.
EPW. 2017. “Punjab’s Voters Settle for the Familiar Kind of Change.” 52 (11), March 18.
Web-Exclusive: https://www.epw.in/journal/2017/11/web-exclusives/punjabs-
voters-settle-familiar-kind-change.html.
First Post. 2014. “Social Engineering: How Congress Lost its Traditional Vote Banks in
Haryana.” October 27. https://www.ﬁrstpost.com/politics/social-engineering-
congress-lost-traditional-vote-banks-haryana-1774761.html.
Heath, O. 2015. “The BJP’s Return to Power: Mobilisation, Conversion and Vote Swing in
the 2014 Indian Elections.” Contemporary South Asia 23 (2): 123–135. doi:10.1080/
09584935.2015.1019427.
India Today. 2019. “Mood of the Nation. How has Narendra Modi’s performance been
as PM.” https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/web-exclusive/story/20190204-motn-
poll-pm-narendra-modi-performance-1439368-2019-01-25.
Jaﬀrelot, C., and G. Verniers. 2011. “Re-nationalization of India’s Political Party System or
Continued Prevalence of Regionalism and Ethnicity?” Asian Survey 51 (6): 1090–1112.
doi:10.1525/as.2011.51.6.1090.
Jha, P. 2017. How the BJP Wins. Inside India’s Greatest Election Machine. New Delhi:
Juggernaut Books.
Kailash, K. K. 2009. “Alliances and Lessons of Election 2009.” Economic and Political
Weekly 44 (39): 52–57.
Kailash, K. K. 2014. “Regional Parties in the 16th Lok Sabha Elections.” Economic and
Political Weekly 49 (39): 64–71.
Kumar, A. 2015. “Where is Caste in Development. Bihar Assembly Elections.” Economic
and Political Weekly 50 (45), November 7. https://www.epw.in/node/146046/pdf.
Mair, P. 2012. “Comparing Party Systems.” In Comparing Democracies: New Challenges in
the Study of Elections and Voting, edited by L. LeDuc, R. G. Niemi, and P. Norris, 88–
107. London: Sage.
Mathur, C. 2014. “The AAP Eﬀect. Decoding the Delhi Assembly Elections.” Economic
and Political Weekly 49 (12), March 22. https://www.epw.in/node/129207/pdf.
Misra, U. 2016. “Victory for Identity Politics, not Hindutva in Assam.” Economic and
Political Weekly 51 (22): 20–23.
Moussavi, B., and G. Macdonald. 2015. “Minoritarian Rule - How India’s Electoral System
Created the Illusion of a BJP Landslide.” Economic and Political Weekly 50 (8): 18–21.
352 A. H. SCHAKEL ET AL.
National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution. 2002. Report of the
National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution. New Delhi:
Universal Law Publishing.
Noronha, F. 2017. “Carrying on a Dubious Game in Goa.” Economic and Political Weekly
52 (11), March 18. https://www.epw.in/journal/2017/12/commentary/carrying-
dubious-game-goa.html.
Palshikar, S. 2014. “A New Phase of the Polity.” The Hindu, May 22.
Palshikar, S. 2018. “Towards Hegemony. BJP Beyond Electoral Dominance.” Economic
and Political Weekly 53 (33): 36–42.
Phanjoubam, P. 2017. “BJP’s Short Term Score in Manipur.” Economic and Political
Weekly 52 (11), March 18. https://www.epw.in/journal/2017/11/web-exclusives/
bjps-short-term-score-manipur.html.
Phanjoubam, P. 2018. “How BJP Won Without Winning in Nagaland.” Economic and
Political Weekly 53 (10), March 10. https://www.epw.in/engage/article/bjp-won-
without-winning-nagaland.
Roy, R. 2016. “Nothing Succeeds Like Success in West Bengal.” Economic and Political
Weekly 51 (22): 24–26.
Roy, E. 2018. “How Tripura was Won.” The Indian Express, June 26. https://indianexpress.
com/article/india/tripura-assembly-elections-2018-results-bjp-manik-sarkar-amit-
shah-narendra-modi-5085186/.
Sartori, G. 1976. Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Schakel, A. H. 2013. “Congruence between Regional and National Elections.”
Comparative Political Studies 46 (5): 631–662. doi:10.1177/0010414011424112.
Schakel, A. H., and W. Swenden. 2018. “Rethinking Party System Nationalization in India
(1952–2014).” Government and Opposition 53 (1): 1–25. doi:10.1017/gov.2015.42.
Seethi, K. M. 2016. “Left Front Victory in Kerala. A Verdict for ‘Social-Re-engineering’.”
Economic and Political Weekly 51 (22): 29–31.
Sharma, C. K., and W. Swenden. 2017. “Continuity and Change in Contemporary Indian
Federalism.” India Review 16 (1): 1–13.
Singh, M. P., and R. Saxena. 2003. India at the Polls: Parliamentary Elections in the Federal
Phase. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan.
Sridharan, E. 2014. “India’s Watershed Vote: Behind Modi’s Victory.” Journal of
Democracy 25 (4): 20–23.
Suri, K. C., and S. Palshikar. 2014. “India’s 2014 Lok Sabha Elections.” Economic and
Political Weekly 49 (39): 39–49.
Tharamalangam, J. 2016. “Moditva in India: A Threat to Inclusive Growth and
Democracy.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 37 (3): 298–315.
The Hindu. 2009. “How India Voted: Verdict 2009.” The Hindu, May 26.
The Hindu. 2018. “The BJP’s Electoral Juggernaut Meets Opposition Unity.” The Hindu,
May 31.
The Hindustan Times. 2019. “Lok Sabha Polls 2019: After Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu,
BJP now Eyes Poll Alliances in Kerala, Andhra Pradesh.” February 21. https://www.
hindustantimes.com/lok-sabha-elections/lok-sabha-elections-2019-after-
maharashtra-tamil-nadu-bjp-now-eyes-poll-alliances-in-kerala-andhra-pradesh/
story-O1wD1mne9e4AUahMXEx8XK.html.
The New Indian Express. 2018. “Discontent of Allies May Burn BJP in 2019 Lok Sabha
Election.” The New Indian Express, March 9.
Tillin, L. 2015. “Regional Resilience and National Party System Change. India’s 2014
General Elections in Context.” Contemporary South Asia 23 (2): 181–197.
REGIONAL & FEDERAL STUDIES 353
Vaishnav, M., and D. Smogard. 2014. “A New Era in Indian Politics?” https://
carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/10/new-era-in-indian-politics-pub-55883.
Yadav, Yogendra. 1999. “Electoral Politics in the Time of Change: India’s Third Electoral
System, 1989–99.” Economic and Political Weekly 34 (34/35): 2393–2399.
Ziegfeld, A. 2014. “India’s Election Isn’t As Historic As People Think.” Washington Post,
May 16.
354 A. H. SCHAKEL ET AL.
